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Two Views of Assistance 
 
 
Introduction 
Imagine that you are walking down the street, and see a child drowning in a shallow 
pond. As Peter Singer has argued, you have a moral obligation to save the child, even if it 
means getting your clothes muddy. However, we might also ask: how was it that the child 
was drowning in the first place? What were the circumstances that led to the possibility 
of a child in such a precarious position? If we have obligations to the drowning child, do 
we not have obligations to reduce the risk of children drowning in the first place?  To put 
it another way, if we have obligations to save someone in crisis, do we not also have 
important duties to reduce the chances of crisis? 
The same concerns apply if we consider complex events in the real world. In 
2010, Haiti was devastated by an earthquake whose epicenter was close to Port-au-
Prince, causing well over 200,000 people to lose their lives, and resulted in more than 1.5 
million people displaced from their homes. This earthquake caused not only the 
immediate loss of life from the initial devastation, but several secondary problems as 
well: thousands of deaths from cholera, deep rifts in the social fabric, and a schooling 
crisis. To its credit, the international community provided more than $10 billion in aid in 
 2 
response.
1
 Just as importantly, however, we should ask how it was that the earthquake 
was able to cause so much devastation. The earthquake was both quite strong – 7.0 on the 
Richter scale – and quite close to a major city.  However, we can compare this to another 
earthquake – the 1989 San Francisco earthquake, which was a 6.9 on the Richter scale, 
and also located in a high-population area. That earthquake caused 67 deaths, and injured 
approximately 3,000 more. While a 7.0 is stronger than a 6.9, especially on a logarithmic 
scale, it is not nearly so strong as to explain the enormous difference in casualties.   
A nontrivial reason for this difference lies in institutional features of each society. 
San Francisco is a wealthy city with an effective set of government and non-government 
institutions, and Port-au-Prince is a poor city in a low-income country with a variety of 
institutional challenges.  This manifests itself most clearly in the fact that San Francisco 
has quite rigorous building codes, which are enforced by professional specialists. In 
2010, Haiti did not have any building codes whatsoever. A study by the Organization of 
American States suggested that even a 2.0 earthquake would have caused severe 
damage.
2
 The lesson to learn from this comparison seems clear: an earthquake is a natural 
event - what happens to human beings as a result is not. No one wants to live in an unsafe 
environment. But not everyone has the social and political standing to be able to 
effectively agitate for change. Only some social and political institutions are 
appropriately responsive to citizens’ needs. If we want to understand how to reduce 
suffering – even from natural disasters – we need to think about how to empower people 
in ways that protect their interests. 
                                                        
1
 Some basic facts about the earthquake can be found here: http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/12/world/haiti-
earthquake-fast-facts/ 
2
 More details can be found here: http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/01/13/haiti.construction/ 
and http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/haiti/ 
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Just as we have an obligation to help a child drowning in a shallow pond, we had 
an obligation to provide assistance to Haiti after the earthquake. Singer’s argument 
clearly articulates why we have such an obligation. What’s more, the argument works 
because we are intuitively compelled by need to help the drowning child. However, in 
both cases, merely offering resources to conduct a relief effort fails to address how it was 
that there was a crisis in the first place. Our main obligation is to reduce the risk of such 
crises taking their toll on human beings. To do so we need to think beyond merely 
assistance as a form of humanitarian relief, but to think of assistance as development.
3
 
The first part of the paper provides a brief statement of the relief view. In the 
second part of the paper, we offer normative and empirical reasons to reject the latter. 
Finally in part three we sketch, and provide an initial justification for, an alternative 
approach, namely, the development view. The development view goes beyond the 
concern for short-term fixes and pays greater attention to the institutional conditions of 
the poor, to their agency, and to their voice. The paper makes two substantive 
contributions to the existing literature on the ethics of international assistance and global 
justice. First, it builds what we take to be a widely held set of propositions about 
international assistance into a consistent view (i.e. the relief view), shows why it is 
intuitively appealing, and yet articulates a strong case against its desirability. Second, it 
sketches a more attractive alternative (i.e. the development view). To do so the paper uses 
Sen’s idea of agent-oriented development as a starting point while at the same time 
                                                        
3
 In this article, we use assistance as an overarching term that encompasses all forms of economic, political 
and technical help that a country, or organization extends to a country, group, or individual within a 
different country. As it will become clear below, this definition of assistance incorporates both traditional 
forms of humanitarian aid, and broader forms of development assistance. We use the terms donor or sender 
to refer to those agents that offer assistance. We use the term recipient(s) to refer to those agents that 
receive the assistance. We define the relationship between donors and recipients as the assistance 
relationship. 
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providing a generalization of Sen’s account and a justificatory framework that does not 
rely on the capability approach. 
 
 
I. The Relief view 
We want to help the drowning child.  Indeed, disaster relief often serves as a focal point 
for charitable giving. The Haitian earthquake brought in $10 billion in donations. The 
2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean brought in $14 billion in donations. When our attention 
is focused on a crisis, we tend to want to help those in need. When we find out that 
people are without water, we send water. When we find out that people are without food, 
we try and give them some. If they are without clothes, we send clothes. We often band 
together as a (global) community to provide aid when disaster strikes. 
These are all noble impulses. They also embody a particular way of thinking 
about assistance. This mental model of assistance is that our role is to eliminate sources 
of (material) deprivation. The best way to do that is to supply people with their basic 
needs when they lack them. The picture can be, roughly, stated as follows:  
 
Proposition 1: the overarching political goal of international assistance is to 
eradicate global poverty; 
 
Proposition 2: global poverty is to be understood as a condition of material scarcity 
that is capable of being addressed by short-term transfers of resources between 
 5 
those who have a surplus of such resources to those who face severe material 
deprivation;  
 
Proposition 3: assistance is what comes from an agent (the donor), be that an 
individual or an organization of some kind, to needy individuals (the recipients); 
 
Proposition 4: assistance is a type of support or help we provide for the sake of 
recipients’ basic interests4; 
 
Proposition 5: within the assistance relationship, such basic interests are to be 
understood as closely related to the physical needs of recipients
5
; 
 
Proposition 6: the eradication of global poverty is relatively easily achievable and 
failure to do so can only be explained by weakness of moral commitment. 
 
Call propositions 1 to 6 ‘the relief view’ of assistance. Taken together they articulate a 
conception of international assistance that is sufficiently widespread to deserve critical 
scrutiny. Put differently, we view these propositions as part of the background mental 
model of most lay people and many philosophers when they consider questions of global 
justice and international assistance: even if these are not clearly stated premises in 
arguments, they fairly clearly shape thinking on these issues. One of the merits of clearly 
                                                        
4
 We rely on the idea of basic interests throughout this paper, but nothing hinges on a particular formulation 
of basic interests.  Our argument equally applies to welfare-oriented accounts. 
5
 To be clear, we do not claim that this is the view of basic interests that those who subscribe to the relief 
view endorse as correct per se. Rather, the claim is about how the basic interests of recipients are portrayed 
within the international assistance relationship.  
 6 
articulating the relief view is that it helps us formalize these widespread intuitions and 
clarifies how they hang together. As a result, the kind of moral and empirical 
shortcomings one can be led to by subscribing to a relief-oriented conception are easier to 
detect.  This motivates adopting an alternative approach to the assistance relationship. 
 In case one might think that this is a straw man or a caricature, let us consider 
some recent examples. According to USAID, after the earthquake in Haiti, charities and 
private donors in the US sent more than 100,000 bottles of water to the Dominican 
Republic to then be delivered to Haiti. This was at a cost of nearly $350,000. This 
amount of water could hydrate about 40,000 people for one day. It then generated 
enormous amounts of trash that there was no internal capacity to handle, and contributed 
to the pollution of waterways. Water purifiers, on the other hand, could have provided as 
much clean water for about $300. 
6
 After the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, Indonesian 
beaches were clogged with piles of donated clothes that relief workers did not have time 
to sort. The clothes eventually started rotting, and had to be burned, as they were turning 
toxic to locals. The reader might think that these are cherry-picked examples, but this sort 
of in-kind contribution is rampant. Just go to your local food drive, where people donate 
cans of food, even if it has to be shipped far away to reach its intended recipients.   
 Of course, this sort of challenge is easily resolved if people simply switch to 
giving money instead of goods. But we are still then working within the relief view, just 
somewhat more efficiently. In a 2016 survey of high net worth philanthropists, the 
number one target of funds, from 63% of all donors, was for the provision of basic 
                                                        
6 http://www.cidi.org/disaster-survivors-dont-need-bottled-water/ 
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necessities.
7
 The biggest “affinity” cause was for children. The second was for women 
and girls. (ibid) 
 Many charities are aware of these impulses we have, and seek to harness them in 
advertising campaigns to increase donations. Charities often depict poor starving 
children, or people who lack any agency to solve their own problems. Charities show 
victims of abuse, victims of natural disasters, and victims of poverty. They show us 
carriers of harms. They offer us the opportunity to take action to relieve these burdens.   
This is not to say that these are not worthy targets of assistance. But rather it is to say that 
these images are chosen precisely because they align so nicely with our relief view 
mental model. In this understanding of assistance, we are the agents, and we relieve the 
burdens of those who are unable to help themselves. The relief view encourages us to 
imagine ourselves as the agents. It is our actions that make a difference. The recipients 
are not subjects as much as objects: they passively carry harms that we as agents are able 
to relieve through the provision of material goods. 
Moreover, while few authors endorse all six propositions, parts of the relief view 
are strongly congruent with several prominent accounts. Early versions of Peter Singer’s 
work, for example, utilize all six.  His “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” (1972) one of 
the most widely read pieces in the global justice literature, at least implicitly endorses the 
basic elements of the relief view. Unger (1996) expands on Singer’s approach, and 
notably focuses on recipients of assistance as carriers of harms that we can relieve.  
However, the relief view is not limited to Singer-style approaches. Consider the approach 
based on negative duties developed by Thomas Pogge. Pogge should be credited for 
                                                        
7 https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/11234/high-net-worth_oct_2017-1.pdf 
figure 6 
 8 
providing a more plausible picture of the political roots of global poverty by emphasizing 
the culpability of the global rich. However, his approach often neglects, in line with 
proposition 3 of the relief conception, the role that the global poor should play as active 
participants in the assistance relationship (see Deveaux, 2015). The global poor are 
mainly victims. Lifting ‘them’ out of poverty will primarily rely as a strategy on ‘our’ 
attempts to reform powerful global governance institutions controlled by Western 
governments.   
One feature that is often overlooked about this debate is how unattractive, 
implausible and incomplete this view of what we can call the (international) assistance 
relationship actually is. Such a view largely assumes a reductionist conception of the 
basic interests of recipients, it depicts them as patients or victims, passively carrying a 
burden that the donors can determine and relieve, and downplays the importance of their 
input in the assistance relationship. It thus offers us what we believe to be a morally 
unattractive view of the assistance relationship. Secondly, the view is deeply implausible 
because it fails to acknowledge the long-term roots of poverty.
8
 It tends to picture poverty 
as a short term problem of ‘stocks’ rather than a longer term problem of ‘flows’, as a 
natural occurrence rather than as a social, economic and political condition. Finally, the 
view is incomplete because it fails to acknowledge the underlying empirical trends that 
are at work in international society. The fact of the matter is that the vast majority of 
resources in international assistance are devoted to development rather than humanitarian 
aid. By neglecting development, the bulk of international assistance, the relief view 
effectively leaves us unable to normatively guide our efforts to evaluate our existing 
                                                        
   
 9 
practices in a morally important domain. Endorsing the relief view simply means that we 
lack a ‘development ethic’ (see Crocker, 2008: 86). 
 
 
II. Problems With the Relief view 
 
a. Why the Relief view is Morally Unattractive 
The first problem of the Relief view is that it is based on an underlying moral asymmetry 
between donors and recipients. Secondly and relatedly, the relief view downplays the 
importance of recipients’ voice in the assistance relationship. Thirdly, the relief view 
accepts a deeply simplistic account of the basic interests of recipients.  
In order to sharpen these points, let us go back to what we have called the relief 
view of assistance and more specifically let’s focus on proposition 3. The first feature of 
this view of assistance is that the latter seems to presuppose the fact that donors and 
recipients stand in what we can call strongly asymmetrical positions. In other words, 
borrowing the expressions from Amartya Sen (1999) and David Miller (2007), donors are 
mainly seen as the agents in the standard picture of assistance, while recipients are 
mainly seen as patients or passive receivers.
9
 In Singer’s case, this couldn’t be more 
apparent. His metaphor is of a drowning child. Undoubtedly, Singer employed the use of 
                                                        
9
 According to a standard account of the terms: “X is a moral patient if and only if X is a legitimate object 
of moral concern (…)” (Rowlands, 2012: 72). While “X is a moral agent if and only if X is (a) morally 
responsible for, and so can be (b) morally evaluated (praised or blamed, broadly understood) for, its 
motives and actions.” (Rowlands, 2012: 75). As Rowlands correctly notes, most individuals tend to occupy 
both roles. What is striking about the global justice literature is that the global poor are effectively 
portrayed as occupying just one of them, namely, the role of moral patients. For an excellent extended 
discussion of this concern see Crocker (2008: ch. 8). For a statement of the complaint see also Kuper 
(2002). 
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a child to maximize our sense of obligation. But using a child as an example also implies 
that the recipient of aid is not a full agent. Children are not taken to be responsible moral 
agents in the way that adults are. They are, for the most part, moral patients. Even if one 
holds the position that the recipients of aid are in an unjust situation not of their own 
making, and external assistance is necessary, one can still argue that they have claims on 
our assistance without claiming that they are the moral equivalent of a child. This is, per 
se, a striking picture.  Notice that this is congruent with charities depicting needy children 
in their calls for donations, and youth-oriented charities receiving more donations than 
general-purpose aid organizations.   
The asymmetry between donors and recipients of international assistance in the 
relief conception is further characterized by two features that explain why we should be 
uncomfortable with it from a moral point of view. Firstly, it seems to suggest that the idea 
of responsibility, a central notion within much of contemporary liberal political 
philosophy, is basically out of place when we think about assistance. Note how this is an 
assumption that has widespread implications. For example, it suggests that it is difficult 
to even think about the role that responsibility can play when we consider the condition 
of the global poor, and most importantly, for undertaking the correct steps to relieve it or 
eradicate it. At face value, this may seem as an obviously sound statement. To simply 
blame the global poor for their own condition will (correctly) strike many as callous.  
Yet, the underlying preoccupation with responsibility need not be confined to the 
attribution of blame. While the very idea of a moral agent is closely related to the concept 
of moral responsibility (see note 11), there is no need to equate responsibility and blame. 
That is not the only role we assign to the idea of responsibility in moral and political 
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philosophy. To see an agent as even only potentially responsible for the condition in 
which she finds herself affects both the conception we have of her and that she has of 
herself. For example, it suggests that she is capable of taking responsibility for her 
situation once certain specified background conditions obtain. To see someone as being 
able to take responsibility for her condition is to assign an agential role to her. It means to 
see the person in question not as a passive receiver of her fate, but as an active participant 
in the creation of her future; as someone who will affect the way in which her life will 
unfold over time. Moreover, seeing an agent as being able to take responsibility for her 
condition is to assign a special kind of dignity to her choices, the dignity that is the 
outcome of one’s ability to reflectively endorse one’s ends and commitments. Finally, to 
be seen as and treated as if one were capable of taking responsibility is also a way for 
individuals to enhance their sense of pride and self-respect. Put simply, in denying 
recipients of assistance the capability of taking responsibility for their condition, we deny 
them full moral status. 
Secondly, the asymmetric relationship between donors and recipients downplays 
the relevance of recipients’ voice and participatory role in the assistance process. The 
donor identifies a deficiency for some population, and then provides material resources to 
overcome the deficiency. This approach is quite standard – virtually all major donors, 
whether they are countries, foundations, or large international NGOs like UNICEF, the 
Red Cross or the World Bank have historically relied on this approach to aid. This is also, 
we believe, the standard way that aid is conceptualized by laypeople and in the global 
justice literature. However, this approach is, we argue, deeply problematic from a moral 
point of view. It provides a narrative in which the global poor are effectively depicted as 
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carriers of a condition rather than agents confronted with a problem.  That someone needs 
help does not mean that she is unable to contribute to improving her own situation. 
The relief view most naturally suggests a conception of recipients as patients in an 
almost literal sense. The provider/sender tries to relieve the suffering and pain that the 
patient/receiver is going through. What really speaks for the receiver/patient here is her 
condition and the needs and pains that need to addressed and relieved. The metaphor of 
the patient is not at all innocent. The patient is not simply passive because the cure comes 
from the doctor, she is also passive because the doctor can establish the source of her 
condition and relieve it without finding the patient’s input as decisive or necessary. The 
recipient population on this model simply is the stand-in for a particular type of disease. 
Donors then ‘treat the disease’ by attempting to relieve the deprivation. On this approach, 
the wants, interests, and cultural context of the recipients is not brought to the fore – as 
passive recipients, they do not get considered as agents who may understand their 
situation differently from the donors. The recipient/patient is merely the carrier of a set of 
problems, rather than an agent with her own priorities and understanding of her 
situation.
10
 
Finally, note how Propositions 4 and 5 of the relief view rely on a very specific 
and, in our view very narrow, account of recipients’ basic interests. The picture seems 
one that is strongly biased in favor of what we can roughly define as basic physical 
needs. There is no denying that those who are starving, and fall victim to illness and 
various forms of deprivation are firstly and foremost in need of very specific forms of 
                                                        
10
 For an account of the ‘passivity critique’ of the basic needs perspective see Crocker (2008: 136 ff.). Here 
we gloss over the fact that the physical needs perspective in much of the global justice literature seems to 
assume that physical needs can be specified in ways that are independent of the cultural context of 
recipients. We briefly address this point in part III.  
 13 
relief geared to address the most immediate set of physical needs with which they are 
confronted. Life without water, food, shelter, and basic medicines simply does not last 
very long. However, while priority is, in some circumstances, justified, giving priority 
does not excuse one from the broader task of situating these broadly physical needs in a 
wider account of what such basic interests are and thus what it means to promote them.
11
 
For example one could see such needs as part of a view of basic interests based on the 
satisfaction of individual preferences. Or, alternatively, one could see them as part of an 
account of basic human capabilities. Finally, one could see these basic interests as part of 
and precondition for the successful ability to participate in political life and to contribute, 
together with other members of one’s community, to the political self-
determination/collective autonomy of one’s people both within and outside one’s borders. 
What is crucial here is that which picture of recipients’ basic interests we want to 
assume is bound to affect the kind of purposes we will attach to the assistance we provide 
and thus will affect, normatively, the very ways in which we decide to carry out our 
obligations to aid those who are in need. If we perceive the problem facing the global 
poor is a lack of water or medicines, then providing water and medicine solves the 
problem. If we perceive the problem of the poor as being unable to engage in collective 
self-determination, or individually develop a plan of life, then the solution to the problem 
is rather more complex. In the same way, seeing individual interests as strongly related to 
the wide array of social, cultural and political values that most individuals care about is 
                                                        
11
 For an excellent discussion of the relationship between needs and international assistance see Crocker 
(2008: 129 ff.). For the basic needs approach to development see Streeten et. al. (1981). For a critique and 
re-elaboration of the basic needs approach see Sen (1984). The conceptual point is that a basic needs 
perspective is not necessarily concerned with physical needs – people do not live by bread alone (see Brock 
and Reader, 2002). Our main concern is with a conception of basic interests understood as basic physical 
needs, not a general critique of the basic needs approach.   
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bound to affect the types of means that we deem appropriate to discharge our duties by 
stressing the role of local input and political priorities.
12
 
This is not merely a theoretical point. Consider a recent high-profile example: the 
PlayPump. The PlayPump was meant to be an innovative technological solution to the 
problem of water availability. It was hailed by multiple aid prominent aid organizations 
and a variety of celebrities. It was a merry-go-round that would use the work generated 
by the spinning to pump groundwater into a basin. It had great intentions – it gave 
children a new toy, and was supposed to reduce the time mothers spent pumping water.  
It was also a total failure. Connecting the merry-go-ground to a pump meant that it was 
much harder for children to spin it, so it was not a good toy for them. On top of that, it 
then turned playtime into work time for children, which can create the idea that 
development agencies endorse the concept of child labor. When mothers tried to pump 
water, they were essentially using a vastly inferior pump, which increased the time it took 
them to get water for their family. Outside agents, looking to relieve people of a burden, 
in fact increased their burdens by failing to actually engage with the recipients as agents.  
PlayPumps had to be removed and replaced with normal pumps. A great deal of time and 
money was spent making people’s lives harder, not easier, as a result of taking the relief 
view to assistance. 
 
 
 
                                                        
12
 To illustrate, as Sen (1999) argued, if we shift our attention away from material deprivation, and towards 
the question of whether people are (for instance) food secure, we find that it is people’s political standing 
that best ensures that they avoid malnutrition and famine. We do not intend to suggest that donors should 
establish the ‘correct’ account of the basic interests of recipients. As we will see below, local input is 
crucial.  
 15 
b. Why the Relief view is Empirically Implausible 
Now consider propositions 3 and 6 in the relief view. The relief view, we have claimed, 
is deeply implausible. It is implausible because, simply put, it suggests a view of poverty 
as a problem that can be fixed in the short-term. Furthermore, it often tends to depict it as 
the result of natural events or brute bad luck instead of seeing its roots in social and 
political factors.  
To begin with, the relief view suggests a conception of poverty as a short-term 
problem that can be literally ‘fixed’ by transferring resources or relevant goods to 
recipients. This picture is, in our view, deeply implausible (see Sen and Dreze, 1989; 
Wenar, 2007; 2011). The relief view imagines that poverty is an issue of what economists 
refer to as stocks, rather than flows. The particular level of material endowment at the 
present moment is the problem, not the productive capacity of the population through 
time. As result, while short-term deprivation may be addressed, little is done to improve 
future states.  
This problem is relatively easy to illustrate. For instance, building a well or water 
pump may allow for easier access to clean water in the present moment, but that does not 
ensure future access to water. If the well or pump breaks, and there is not local 
knowledge of how to repair it, it will go unused.
13
 Similarly, providing clean water at the 
source does not ensure clean water at the point of use – dirty hands, dirty water jugs, and 
dirty dishes can all conspire to carry dangerous water-borne diseases that can contaminate 
water, even if it was clean at the source (Ahuja et al 2010, Kremer et al 2011). 
                                                        
13
 A March 2009 report from the International Institute for Environment and Development suggests that 
there are over 50,000 water access points across Africa that are non-functional due to disrepair and lack of 
sustainability planning. http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17055IIED.pdf 
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Alternatively, consider food aid. The latter appears to be the simplest of all of 
these cases. When people need food, a very reasonable impulse would be to feed them.  
However, while food aid works well in the short run, in the medium or long run, the 
assistance can make it more difficult for the recipient population to sustainably feed 
itself. In particular, food aid can often drive local farmers out of business, as it is hard to 
compete with a free product. Once the food aid ends, there is no (or at least degraded) 
internal capacity to replace that food aid with local production. Food relief, though 
obviously delivered with the best possible intentions, can reduce the productive capacity 
of the population by forcing farmers to compete with free food. This can serve to increase 
poverty, rather than alleviate it (Levinsohn and McMillan 2007, Barrett and Maxwell 
2007).
14
 
Perhaps even more worryingly, the relief view suggests a depiction of poverty as 
a form of natural occurrence. It equates destitution to the result of some form of brute 
luck rather than, as it surely is, the result of economic, political and historical processes. 
Poverty and destitution are emphatically not like a tornado or like a storm - they do not 
strike unpredicted and un-announced. People can be easily misled to see things in this 
light. It is just one more instance of confusing what is natural with what is deeply 
artificial. To see how, we suggest the following thought experiment: for each of the relief 
efforts that you are exposed to in the media and/or in the philosophical literature, ask 
yourself the following question, namely, ‘how did we get to this problem?’ Lack of 
access to sanitation, food, and basic medicines means lack of access to the appropriate 
                                                        
14
 It should be stressed that our critique of these cases of relief assistance is not an invitation to inaction. To 
the contrary, the point is to stigmatize the oversimplification of what may initially strike us as simple 
problems. Slightly less obvious alternatives exist that do not distort incentives and the price mechanism, 
such as cash transfers (short term) and the creation of employment opportunities (medium to long term). 
See Crocker (2008) and Heath (2010).  
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institutional context that will provide them. Absolute material scarcity, as Sen and Dreze 
have taught us (1989), is almost never the problem.  
Even in the most extreme circumstances, such as natural disasters, institutional 
conditions are all-important. To illustrate, consider flooding. If a large flood kills several 
thousand people, is this just a matter of luck? The answer, most of the time, is ‘no’. The 
choice to build one’s dwellings in an area that is (almost always ex-ante) known to be 
subject to flooding is a conscious one that the authorities have allowed because they did 
not know how (or were unwilling) to satisfy the housing needs of the population. In the 
introduction we have touched upon the example of an earthquake taking place in two 
different locations. We can extend and generalize the message conveyed by that example. 
When it comes to most natural disasters, being poor and being unlucky are one and the 
same thing because poverty simply pushes the poor to accept risks that most citizens of 
developed countries are not required to run.
15
 These risks are allowed to exist due to 
prevailing social, economic and political circumstances in a given context. Natural 
disasters can cause large-scale human misery only if (deeply artificial) enabling 
conditions obtain. This is of course not limited to the developing world. Hurricane 
Katrina exposed a number of institutional failures in New Orleans. Not only had the 
physical infrastructure in the form of levees been inadequately designed and maintained, 
but also the worst damage was found in poorer areas of the city, because the poor lived 
on lower ground than the wealthy.
16
 
Finally, it should also be stressed that in all the aforementioned examples we have 
assumed that the resources that are employed for aid effectively reach the recipients they 
                                                        
15
 On the effects of socio-economic inequality for risk-taking behaviour see Goodin (1982). 
16
 The 2006 Independent Investigation Team Final Report contains extensive details on the institutional 
failures that led to such large-scale suffering. 
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were intended to reach. This is, at least in the real world, where most aid is conducted in 
situations of conflict and political instability, an implausible assumption. Transferring 
resources in situations of social and political instability is usually a good recipe for, at 
best, inefficiency, and, at worst, aggravating the problem by financing those who are 
responsible for the very instability that has created material deprivation. The iron law of 
political economy is: in the absence of strong institutions, resources flow to the most 
powerful actors (see Wenar, 2007). A clear corollary is that they do not flow the ones 
who are most in need. Donors ignore such law at their own (moral) risk and at recipients’ 
(tangible) cost. Not ignoring it certainly reinforces the commitment to think about the 
institutional context in which poverty is created and assistance is delivered. This 
observation should also explain why those who are sympathetic to the relief view cannot 
simply maintain that immediate relief can be understood as the initial part of a wider 
development effort. Without seeing the problems and the circumstances of the global 
poor through the lenses of what we will call the development view it is simply impossible 
to appreciate the substantial risk of doing harm that is connected to the relief 
perspective.
17
 Within the field of international assistance this type of concern is 
particularly pressing given that the local institutional structures that we are bound to take 
for granted if we accept the relief view are precisely the ones that directly harm recipients 
and often explain their need for outside help.   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17
 We would like to thank XXXX for pushing us to address this point. 
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c.  Why the Relief View is Structurally Incomplete 
In part I we have also claimed that the relief view is (structurally) incomplete. To see 
why, note how the relief view is clearly at odds with the wider empirical trends that we 
can observe in international society. The picture of assistance provided by the relief view 
taken as a whole is closest to what we may classify as humanitarian aid. As Thomas 
Weiss (2013) has recently documented, humanitarian aid has gone through a rather 
phenomenal phase of growth. Both the flow of resources and the sheer number of 
organizations that are committed to humanitarian aid in contexts riddled with conflict and 
deprivation have grown substantially. Humanitarianism is now a significant industry, 
going from a cash flow of just a few billion dollars in the 1990s to whopping 18 billon 
dollars in 2011 (Weiss, 2013: 7). One should thus be excused to believe that this is the 
main form that assistance takes at the international level. However, the numbers collected 
by various international organizations and more research focused NGOs paint a 
dramatically different picture. In the real world, there are roughly 6 dollars spent on long-
term development for each dollar for each dollar spent of humanitarian aid (Global 
Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2014).  
Yet, the relief view of assistance is bound to be silent on these issues. For 
example, why are so many resources spent on large infrastructure programs? Why are so 
many resources dedicated to train members of central bank and treasury departments in 
developing countries? What should be the priorities when it comes to these spending 
decisions and how we decide to allocate funds? The relief view largely fails to engage 
with the most important component of international assistance, which is itself a reason to 
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look for alternatives. To borrow David Crocker’s expression (2008), the relief view 
simply lacks a ‘development ethic’.  
 
 
III. Sketching an Alternative: The Development View 
 
a. Basic Features of the Development View 
 As we have seen in part II there are several important reasons to reject the relief view. In 
what follows we try to sketch an alternative that takes the global poor’s agential role 
seriously, and examines their problems more plausibly. Given the space we have 
available, providing a full-blown account of such an alternative would be impossible.
18
 
However, we do want to make a suggestion about the nature of the alternative and about 
how to construct an initial framework for its justification. The heart of what we take to be 
the most plausible alternative to the relief view is to conceive international assistance as a 
form of support to development. The features of the view we articulate are in part driven 
by what we take to be wrong about the relief picture. In our view, the correct 
understanding of international assistance is characterized by the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1*: the overarching political goal of international assistance is to 
enhance the prospects for the creation of well-functioning and at least decent
19
 local 
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 A fuller articulation would have to provide a clearer picture of duty-bearers in the international assistance 
relationship. On the components of a full-blown development ethic see Crocker (2008: 281-2). For an 
earlier treatment see Goulet (1971).  
19
 Here we will assume, following Rawls (1999), that decent institutions need not be liberal and fully 
democratic, while they should exhibit respect for the rule of law, for basic human rights, and for the 
consultative nature of the political process.    
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institutions that are necessary for persons to adequately sustain themselves in 
perpetuity;
20
 
 
Proposition 2*: in order to achieve this aim it is crucial to work towards the long 
term improvement of the quality of a country’s governance structures and its 
relationship with the international system – material scarcity is rarely the 
underlying problem;  
 
Proposition 3*: assistance is to be understood as the complex and dynamic 
partnership between one agent (the donor), be that an individual, country or an 
organization of some kind, and a different group of agents (the recipients); 
 
Proposition 4*: assistance is a type of support provided for the sake of individuals’ 
basic interests properly understood; 
 
Proposition 5*: a proper understanding of individuals’ basic interests should not be 
confined to material needs and should provide ample space for the realization of 
social and political values insofar as the latter are crucial to individuals’ 
conceptions of the good and to their welfare; 
 
                                                        
20
 The word ‘adequately’ refers to the quality of life that decent institutions can guarantee to those who live 
under them. What is adequate is, of course, a matter of dispute. While we cannot settle the question here, 
we tend to think that, within certain limits, what is adequate should be defined in terms of what is deemed 
to be so locally.  
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Proposition 6*: accepting the development view means accepting the deep 
complexity of the assistance relationship and the realistic limitations to our powers 
in line with what we can achieve and what it is proper for us to try to attain – 
eradicating global poverty is not easy and will not be something that can be 
realistically achieved in the short term.
21
 
 
Before moving on to the issue of justification, we want to clarify some of the basic 
aspects of the development view. The development view can be considered as a 
generalization and elaboration of what Sen famously called an ‘agent-oriented’ (1999: 
11) perspective on development.
22
 These views share the basic features of what we have 
called the development view. They recognize the centrality of recipients’ agency, the 
multifaceted nature of their basic interests, and the complexity of the enabling conditions 
that need to be addressed in order to affect the prospects for poverty eradication. All the 
aforementioned components are susceptible of being understood and justified in different 
ways. To illustrate, a concern for agency can be given a Kantian grounding (e.g. as part 
of an ideal of autonomy), a Millean grounding (e.g. as a view concerning the institutional 
preconditions for cultivating individuality), or, following Nussbaum, a more Aristotelian 
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 Going back to one of the concerns potentially raised by using the terminology of assistance (as opposed 
to justice) it should be stressed that the development view is clearly much more demanding than the relief 
view in terms of donors’ commitments. The development view creates very weighty duties towards the 
global poor insofar as it equates our understanding of international assistance to a long-term commitment 
related to institution-building. 
22
 Sen develops a normative ideal of what we can call ‘practical agency’ in his work (see especially 1999). 
Following Crocker and Robeyns (2010), we can say that in Sen’s work “a person (or group) is an agent 
with respect to action X, to the extent that the following…conditions hold (…): (i) self-determination: the 
person decides for…herself rather than someone or something else making the decision to do X; (ii) reason 
orientation and deliberation: the person bases…her decisions on reasons, such as the pursuit of goals; (iii) 
action: the person performs or has a role in performing X; and (iv) impact on the world: the person thereby 
brings about (or contributes to bringing about) change in the world” (80). Within the development view, 
recipients of international assistance are conceptualized as practical agents insofar as they are 
conceptualized as individuals capable of meeting these conditions.  
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one (e.g. as part of a picture of human flourishing), or, accepting political liberals’ worry 
about comprehensive doctrines, it could be seen as a constitutive part of the ideal of 
membership in a well-ordered political society. In the same way, basic interests can be 
understood as well-being, but also, following a more Rawlsian root, as the exercise of 
certain moral powers. Finally, the nature of the enabling conditions that one can chose to 
highlight ranges from the workings of the international economic institutions, to the basic 
norms of the international system and the quality of local (formal and informal) 
institutional and cultural structures (or any ‘weighted’ combination of these factors). In 
what follows we offer an initial articulation of the development view.  
As stressed by propositions 1* and 2*, the development view is geared to reflect a 
much wider concern for the institution-building aspects of international assistance. The 
emphasis on institution-building and institutional capacity is grounded in an interest in 
promoting the individual agency of recipients, while at the same time accepting the 
enabling role that institutions play for allowing the latter to be stably achieved. Moreover, 
propositions 2* and 6* express the fact that to accept the development view is to accept 
that our commitment to international assistance is a long-term enterprise: there are no 
short fixes, no resources that can be magically transferred to end the problem. Building 
institutions is almost never a short-term endeavor. Nor is it the case that poverty is the 
same everywhere – different institutional environments shape both the causes and effects 
of poverty. 
Proposition 3* of the development view also reflects the fact that it is aimed at 
being more participatory than the relief view. It sees recipients as first and foremost 
agents that need to be active participants in the assistance process. The development 
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perspective takes as its central goal the recipient’s ability to provide for her own needs 
independently and without the continued need to rely on outside help. In the development 
view, assistance providers and assistance recipients are seen as co-generators of 
solutions, and their relationship is one of basic equality in terms of decision-making 
authority and power to influence and orient the specific purposes of assistance. Thus the 
development view requires the ability for recipients to have a strong form of voice in, for 
example, setting priorities in terms of where and for what purposes assistance should be 
directed. Put differently, the assistance relationship needs to be seen as a partnership. 
There are no patients or victims within it, but different sets of agents facing different 
circumstances, with different sources of knowledge.  
Moreover, it is important to stress that the development view also pays attention 
to how recipients (especially collectives) integrate with the international system (this is 
made clear by proposition 2*). In fact, integration with the international system, emphasis 
on institutional capacity, and increased agency for recipients are all intimately related in 
several important circumstances that characterize the global economic and political order. 
To illustrate, think about the so-called resource curse (here we follow Wenar, 2008). The 
latter is made possible by the fact that in international society, at least for what concerns 
the ownership of natural resources, might makes right: those who control a territory, 
independently of how such control is achieved or perpetuated, can legally sell the natural 
resources of the territory. Over time, this kind of institutional rule has increased the 
outburst of civil conflicts, of authoritarian regimes, and lowered the economic prospects 
of those who are affected. The resource curse is a clear case where the international 
system contributes to the destruction of local institutional capacity. In this picture, the 
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first imperative for those who are committed to the development view is to remove these 
incentives, and to effectively stop the process by which rich countries contribute to the 
resource curse. Removing this type of obstacle is often the main part of the initial effort 
to allow local political movements to start a process of institution building that is driven 
by local priorities and reflects their agency.  
The role of international and global governance institutions and how the 
development view addresses the impact of such institutional processes is something we 
are keen to emphasize. Doing so will allow us to dispel a potential misinterpretation of 
the conception of international assistance we are putting forward. It is a truism that we 
live in an increasingly globalized world (Held, 2010). A slightly more specific way to 
capture the meaning of the aforementioned proposition is to look at the explosion in the 
numbers of international and global governance institutions (see Held and Hale, 2011), 
their growing impact on the daily lives of persons around the world, and their growing 
reach within domains of social, political, and economic cooperation that were previously 
thought of as the purview of domestic authority and jurisdiction (see Buchanan, 2013, ch: 
6). The emphasis that the development view puts on the quality of domestic governance 
may suggest, for example, that we discount the pervasive effects of globalization on a 
country’s ability to successfully integrate in the world economy.   
We deny that. In order to provide a reply, a brief comment on the background 
empirical assumptions we are making. We can conceptualize the role to attribute to 
international and global governance institutions in debates about the origins of a 
country’s prospect for development as a continuum between two boundary points: we can 
call these ‘explanatory nationalism’ and ‘explanatory globalism’ (see Jaggar, 2010). It is 
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fair to say that few would want to position themselves on one of these boundary points 
(see Rodrik, 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 45ff for extensive empirical 
discussions). To do so, to believe in either ‘explanatory nationalism’ or ‘explanatory 
globalism’, is implausible and would suggest a black and white picture of the global 
institutional landscape. Thus, the development view occupies a point on the continuum 
between the two aforementioned options. Put differently, the development view builds on 
a certain conception of the background circumstances that affect the prospect for 
successful assistance. Such background should not be interpreted as a specific set of 
propositions. Rather, it should be seen as a conceptual space – one in which quality of 
domestic, international, and transnational institutions interact, often in very complex 
ways, to determine the likelihood that the goals of international assistance will be met.  
Finally, while it is tempting when faced with extreme deprivation and suffering to 
reduce our concern for the poor to basic physical needs, propositions 4* and 5* of the 
development view urge us to recognize the wider spectrum of basic human interests. In 
our characterization we have emphasized the importance of the social and political 
dimension of such interests, as a corrective compared to the relief view. An individual 
facing severe and continued material scarcity is alone in her misery and need. She is 
isolated from the rest of the world, almost a prisoner in her body. There is no doubt that 
no one should experience that type of condition. Yet, at the same time, it is precisely by 
acknowledging the wider set of basic interests that all individuals do have that we most 
effectively highlight the inhumane character of those circumstances.          
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b. Justifying the Development View 
But this still leaves open the ‘why’ question? Why should we gear assistance toward the 
development perspective? In what follows we provide seven reasons that we take to be 
central to the justification of the development view. Beyond their substantive content, 
what is relevant about these reasons is that they offer a justificatory framework that does 
not rely on a specific philosophical perspective. Instead the framework we offer in favor 
of the development view can be portrayed as a set of ‘public reasons’ whose grounding, 
relative priority and strength can be interpreted differently. Proceeding this way will 
allow us to de-couple the justification of the development view from Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s capability approach and thus widen its appeal.  
 Before moving on to explain the reasons that support the development view, we 
would like to comment on their nature and on the structure of the justificatory framework 
they help to create. To begin with, it is important to emphasize that the reasons we 
provide below are public in nature. They constitute, in our view, elements of an ideal of 
global public reason. In the Rawlsian sense of the expression, reasons are public insofar 
as they do not presuppose the acceptance of a specific comprehensive doctrine (Rawls, 
1996). Instead, they are reasons that all can accept as free and equal citizens. Broadly 
speaking, some form of commitment to the idea of public reason can be traced back to 
the work of authors such as Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, but also Habermas and Gaus, 
among others. The main insight, following Jonathan Quong (2013), is that moral and 
political rules that structure a given system of institutions should be acceptable (at a 
suitable level of idealization) to those who live under them.  
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However, clearly, the development view is not a system of rules, nor is it a 
constitutional essential of a liberal democratic polity. So, in what sense are the reasons 
that justify the development view public in nature? The basic idea is that the principles 
that should regulate international assistance in a society of peoples should be based on a 
justificatory framework that is acceptable to all its members in good standing. We should 
be able to justify a view of international assistance in such a way that the role of donors 
and recipients are basically interchangeable and thus that the reasons that support a 
specific conception of assistance are acceptable from the standpoint of both roles. In the 
same way, we should be able to justify a view of assistance so that, within the bounds of 
toleration,
23
 such conception does not presuppose adherence to a specific form of 
political tradition.  
It is hard to overestimate the importance of correctly locating a conception of 
international assistance. Some of the staunchest critics of international aid maintain that it 
is the perpetuation of a paternalistic and/or imperialistic set of practices in which donors 
(mainly Western countries) impose a view of the (political) good life on recipients 
(mainly from non-Western developing countries) (see Baker, 2016; Baaz, 2005; Young, 
2003). Locating a conception of international aid within global public reason tries to 
defuse these concerns. It attempts to make international assistance less exclusionary, 
more sensitive to the concerns of recipients, and less bent on univocally dictating the 
correct path to become a well-ordered people.   
 
                                                        
23 As per the statement of the principles of the development view above, we follow Rawls (1999) in 
maintaining that the scope of international toleration is wider than liberal democracy and can be 
provided by the idea of decency.   
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 Two comments about the structure of the reasons we provide below. These 
reasons are to be understood as a framework with three mutually supporting tiers. The 
first tier is composed of the first two reasons we put forward (namely, a commitment to 
long term effects of aid policies and the relationship with intergenerational fairness). We 
can conceive of the first tier as the kind of reasons that are strictly speaking external to 
the idea of international assistance but might bear on the desirability of a specific 
conception. Thinking about tier one reasons is important to reach a wider form of 
reflective equilibrium by asking whether the development view is consistent with some of 
our considered convictions that go beyond the realm of international assistance. The 
second tier is composed of reasons three, four and five (namely, the epistemic advantages 
of the development view, its attractiveness in light of a commitment to partial self-
reliance, and its more credible account of the basic interests of individuals). The second 
tier of reasons should be seen as the core of the justificatory framework for the 
development view. It concerns the nature of the assistance relationship and how we 
should conceive of recipients and of their interests and predicament in a way that they 
could reasonably endorse from within their own framework of reasons. The third tier is 
composed of reasons six and seven (namely, the effects of adopting the development 
view for responsible international citizenship and reduce international domination). Tier 
three reasons speak to the place of a conception of international assistance in the broader 
conceptual space provided by the ideal of a moderately just international order.   
It is also important to point out that the list of reasons that we put forward is not 
meant to be exhaustive. What we provide is a justificatory framework, not a final 
justification for the development view. The fact that we are not providing a final 
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justification for the development view is not, however, something that should detract 
from the attractiveness of the line of argument suggested by this paper. To the contrary, 
we believe that the framework we have constructed has generative potential that goes 
beyond the distinct reasons we put forward. This can be gleaned from the structure of the 
framework as we have discussed it above. What the structure suggests is that a 
justification for the development view of international assistance can rely on reasons that 
are external to the assistance relationship, reasons that pertain to the nature of the 
assistance relationship itself, and, finally, reasons that describe the place of international 
assistance in the ideal of a just international order. Thinking about the justification of the 
development view through the lenses of these three different kinds of reasons can help us 
generate more reasons to support it and implicitly provides some guidance on how to do 
so. 
First, let us begin with what we have called tier one reasons. Consider what 
motivates the very idea of international assistance. Let us assume, as both the relief view 
and the development view assume, that our duties of assistance are justified by some 
form of concern for the basic interests, however defined, of those we intend to help. It is a 
basic principle of rationality that one should, all other things being equal, favor options 
that can satisfy more rather than less of our preferences or ends.  
Applying this simple counting principle of rationality to assistance, with the 
addition of what we believe are relatively solid empirical regularities, reveals the 
superiority of the development perspective. If assistance is justified in terms of the basic 
interests of the recipients, then, we must be committed to the protection of their basic 
interests not just today, but also tomorrow, the next day, and for the foreseeable future. 
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However, there seems to be no reliable way to make sure that our contribution to the 
protection of the basic interests of those we are helping can be sustained in the 
foreseeable future unless we help recipients to develop their own institutional capacity to 
protect their basic interests. The ability of a society to protect the basic interests of its 
members depends on the types of institutions, both formal and informal, available to 
those members. As we have argued above, poverty is not simply a matter of short-term 
problems dictated by material scarcity. Rather, it is almost always the case that such 
poverty is the outcome of institutional shortcomings. To ensure reliable protection of 
basic interests of a population in perpetuity thus requires addressing the root causes of 
such institutional shortcomings.   
The latter idea is also relevant when it comes to concerns with generational 
fairness. Adopting the development perspective allows us to take a long-term view of the 
problem of global poverty. The goal, as we have been arguing, is to try to address the 
problem of global poverty looking at its roots and with a view that each person and 
society becomes self-reliant in perpetuity. This entails giving more attention from a moral 
point of view to what happens to future generations. Shifting resources from relief to 
development, even at some human cost, can be important in order to provide future 
generations with a better institutional context than the one that present generations in a 
poor country had to deal with. It is, in other words, one way of thinking about 
intergenerational equity by taking it seriously where it matters most. In the 
intergenerational justice literature, concerns are often expressed with respect to what 
kinds of duties we have to those who come after us. We believe that no matter the 
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strength of our obligations, there is no denying that trying to foster well-ordered 
institutions is something that goes in the right direction.
24
    
Now consider what we have called tier two reasons, namely, reasons that concern 
the nature of the assistance relationship. The development of local institutions is central 
to gain what we can call epistemic advantages.
25
 Indeed this is one of the main findings 
of the literature on participatory development, and that provides one of the most 
important justifications for the Participatory Poverty Assessments championed by 
institutions such as the World Bank. Local institutions are usually much more apt, all 
other things being equal, to gather the required information to ascertain the very content 
of people’s basic interests or at least to better determine, given local circumstances, how 
to best protect the basic interests of persons. It is important to stress that this is not a 
commitment to some form of soft cultural relativism. Even if we were to believe that 
basic interests of persons are invariant with respect to social setting, we would still need 
to pay attention to levels of development and social, economic and political 
circumstances in order to operationalize these interests in institutional practices, and 
determine the relevant trade-offs between different basic interests. Even if everyone has 
the same basic interests, how those interests are expressed and understood are quite 
different across a number of cultural contexts. Part of respecting people’s agency is 
engaging them on their own terms. Of course, the reliance on local knowledge, while 
certainly superior from an epistemic perspective, also implies certain trade-offs, for 
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 What we suggest is broadly in line with Rawls’ account of the duty of just savings (1971). However, we 
are not committed to the view that the duty of just savings is all that is owed to future generations. Our 
point is comparative. The development view clearly does better than the alternative, the relief view. We 
would like to thank XXX for pushing us to discuss this argument.  
25
 See Crocker (2008:132) for a discussion of the epistemic advantage argument and its relationship with 
the specification of basic needs. 
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example, in terms of accountability (see for example, Mohan and Stokke, 2000). 
However, while we do not wish to deny the existence of trade-offs, we still want to 
suggest that the epistemic advantage should not be discounted given the complexity of 
development efforts.   
Furthermore, all other things being equal, we can conjecture that those who 
receive our help would rather be able to be self-reliant. The ability to be partly in control 
or responsible for one’s condition is a central aspect of individual self-respect. This is 
something we have already emphasized when describing the shortcomings of the relief 
view. While cooperation and mutual dependence are a fact of life in all human societies, 
all other things being equal, it is not implausible to claim that a state of affairs in which 
individuals believe that they are making a substantive contribution to the protection of 
their own basic interests is superior to its alternatives. This is, in our view, one way to 
understand the relevance of economic liberties as championed by market friendly 
approaches such as the one recently put forward by John Tomasi (2013). The goal is not 
simply to help those in need, but to allow them to help themselves and for them to be able 
to understand their efforts as something that has an impact on their lives.   
In the same way, there are matters that pertain to the very specification of the 
basic interests of those whom we have a duty to help.
26
 As we have argued above, there is 
often a tendency to look at the justification of aid only through the lenses of need and/or 
basic welfare and then to provide a definition of the content of these terms which tend to 
be closely associated with the satisfaction or improvement of persons’ physical/bodily 
condition. However, both what we take to be persons’ needs and what informs their 
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 This claim is distinct from the ‘epistemic advantage’ argument provided above insofar as the latter 
applies irrespective of the specific content we give to individual interests and concerns the way in which we 
can determine such content rather than a specific picture of human interests. 
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welfare cannot be taken to be determined by their physical condition. It is an unjustifiably 
reductionist view of such terms to see them as determined merely by physical functions.  
For example, it is widely acknowledged that persons’ basic interests reflect a wide 
array of goods. Famously, Rawls (1971) claimed that the social bases of self-respect are 
the most important among the primary goods that those of participate to social 
cooperation would want to distribute fairly. In the same way, authors like Kymlicka 
(1996) have relentlessly argued that culture can be central to an individual’s ability to 
lead an autonomous life insofar as it provides context and meaning to her choices. In the 
same way, liberal nationalists like David Miller (1995; 2007) and Yael Tamir (1993) see 
national belonging as a key aspect of individuals’ self-conception and as an important 
instrumental component of the possibility to sustain just social institutions. Finally, think 
of Nussbaum’s (2000; 2011; Nussbaum and Sen 1993) and Sen’s (1989; 1999) work and 
the plurality and heterogeneity of the capabilities and functionings that are seen as 
necessary to lead decent fully human lives. This is crucial to understand a central reason 
to favor the development view over the relief view. The relief view oversimplifies the 
conception of the basic interests of those we are trying to help. Rather than seeing people 
as carriers of deprivation, the development view understands people as agents who wish 
to carry out their own plan of life. Once we accept the latter picture, confining the 
understanding of the poor’s interests to physical needs becomes untenable. 
It is important to note that all these ‘wider’ views of basic interests have 
something in common: they see individuals’ basic interests as partly defined by their 
participation in social life. This is an aspect of the goals of assistance that needs to be 
stressed. If the goal of assistance is to restore individuals’ ability to lead decent lives, 
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lives in which their basic interests are secured/protected, then we need acknowledge that 
it is important to cater to this wider view of human interests that incorporates persons’ 
social, cultural and political relationships. Yet, if we adopt the relief view, we simply 
seem unable to fully appreciate the social, cultural and political components of 
individuals’ basic interests.    
Finally, consider what we have called tier three reasons. The development view 
allows us to connect the concern for assistance with the concern for responsible 
international citizenship. It must be noted that when we help individuals through 
assistance we also, in the long term, hope to allow them to integrate in international 
society. This seems to be Rawls’ view when he articulates his duty of assistance in The 
Law of Peoples (1999). According to Rawls the duty is meant to address what he sees as 
societies facing unfavorable circumstances. To discharge the duty means effectively to 
help the society in question to transition to the status of being well-ordered. A well-
ordered political society, Rawls calls them ‘peoples’, is able to endorse for the right 
reasons a fair law of peoples and thus is able to respect other well-ordered political 
societies as members of the society of well-ordered peoples. According to Rawls this is a 
crucial step towards the elimination of what he calls the great evils of human history, 
which include political injustice and war. This is one way to see why the view of 
assistance as development is able to create important positive externalities and achieve 
goods that are strictly speaking ‘external’ to the assistance relationship itself. The 
creation of positive externalities is to be coupled with the possible preventive action 
against negative externalities such as the emergence of failed states. Failed states are 
certainly first and foremost a tragedy for their own citizens. However it is easy to see that 
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they also pose political problem for the international system. They undermine 
international stability by creating refugees, and large lawless territories that often harbour 
criminal and terroristic activities (see Krasner, 2004).  
Finally, the development view is congruent with several commentators’ focus 
with what we can define as the problem of international domination (see Ronzoni and 
Laborde, 2015; Pettit, 2014; 2010; Fearon and Laitin, 2004). The latter is, roughly 
understood, determined by the great power imbalances in international society. Such 
power imbalances determine different bargaining positions in international economic and 
political organizations that severely constrain the ability of many developing countries to 
be properly in control of the rules and regimes that deeply affect them. The development 
view is essential here to both recognize the urgency of this concern and to try to more 
effectively address it. If we take the development view of international assistance, our 
goal is to build local institutional capacity. If successful, the development of local 
institutional capacity can make developing countries less dependent on foreign donors in 
the long term. The diminished dependence on foreign aid donors is crucial to achieve two 
outcomes that indirectly diminish the concern for international domination. Firstly, it 
would increase the resilience of developing countries and their ability to withstand 
changes to the rules governing the global economy. Secondly, it deprives developed 
countries of one of the main tools through which superior bargaining power is exercised, 
namely, through the threat of stopping economic aid (see Moss et. al., 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
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We have argued that the relief view of assistance fundamentally mischaracterizes the 
assistance relationship.  In doing so, it encourages a view of the poor as patients, 
passively waiting for assistance.  On this account, the poor are treated as carriers of 
deprivation, rather than responsible moral agents capable of developing their own plan of 
life.  
While this account of assistance is well-meaning, and surely better than views that 
blame the global poor for their condition, it lends support to ineffective methods of 
assistance that can inhibit long-term development. In particular, it understands the 
context of poverty as a matter of luck, rather than the outcome of sets of institutional 
arrangements. Assistance on this framework is seen as simply removing material 
deprivation, with the implicit assumption that the problem just is the material deprivation 
itself.  Just as the development view moves us away from models of assistance as relief, it 
moves us away from crassly narrow economic models of development as merely 
propping up markets. By taking a broader, more political view of institutions and their 
role in promoting and protecting agency, the development view can account for why 
‘shock therapy’ approaches to marketization have failed. 
At its most practical, the development view of assistance advocates for more 
resources being devoted to working with recipient partners to develop culturally-
appropriate institutions that facilitate political self-determination, long-term growth and 
ultimately, self-reliance. We should, then, devote our resources not toward short-term 
relief, but building sustainable institutions that are more capable of creating wealth and 
promoting basic human interests. This shift in focus mirrors the move away from the 
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Millennium Development Goals toward the Sustainable Development Goals in the 
international community.   
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